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“Emergence” vs. “Forcing” of Empirical Data? A  
Crucial Problem of “Grounded Theory” Reconsidered 
Udo Kelle ∗ 
Abstract: Since the late 1960s Barney GLASER and 
Anselm STRAUSS, developers of the methodology of 
“Grounded Theory” have made several attempts to expli-
cate, clarify and reconceptualise some of the basic tenets of 
their methodological approach. Diverging concepts and un-
derstandings of Grounded Theory have arisen from these at-
tempts which have led to a split between its founders. Much 
of the explication and reworking of Grounded Theory sur-
rounds the relation between data and theory and the role of 
previous theoretical assumptions. The book which initially 
established the popularity of GLASER’s and STRAUSS’ 
methodological ideas, “The Discovery of Grounded The-
ory”, contains two conflicting understandings of the relation 
between data and theory – the concept of “emergence” on 
the one hand and the concept of “theoretical sensitivity” on 
the other hand. Much of the later developments of 
Grounded Theory can be seen as attempts to reconcile these 
prima facie diverging concepts. Thereby GLASER recom-
mends to draw on a variety of “coding families” while 
STRAUSS proposes the use of a general theory of action to 
build an axis for an emerging theory. This paper first sum-
marises the most important developments within “Grounded 
Theory” concerning the understanding of the relation be-
tween empirical data and theoretical statements. Thereby 
special emphasis will be laid on differences between 
GLASER’s and STRAUSS’ concepts and on GLASER’s 
current critique that the concepts of “coding paradigm” and 
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“axial coding” described by STRAUSS and Juliet CORBIN 
lead to the “forcing” of data. It will be argued that 
GLASER’s critique points out some existing weaknesses of 
STRAUSS’ concepts but vastly exaggerates the risks of the 
STRAUSSian approach. A main argument of this paper is 
that basic problems of empirically grounded theory con-
struction can be treated much more effectively if one draws 
on certain results of contemporary philosophical and epis-
temological discussions and on widely accepted concepts 
developed in such debates. This especially refers to the cri-
tique of naïve empiricism, to the concept of hypothetical or 
abductive inference, to the concept of empirical content or 
falsifiability of statements and to the concept of corrobora-
tion. 
1. How Do Categories “Emerge” From the Data?  
“Theoryladenness” of Observations as a Problem for 
Grounded Theory Methodology 
Can the claim to discover theoretical categories and propositions from empiri-
cal data be reconciled with the fact that researchers always have to draw on 
already existing theoretical concepts when analysing their data? In the past 
three decades following the publication of GLASER’s and STRAUSS’ famous 
methodological monograph “The Discovery of Grounded Theory” both authors 
have made several attempts to make these two conflicting methodological 
requirements compatible.  
One of the main purposes of GLASER’s and STRAUSS’ “Discovery book” 
was to challenge the hypothetico-deductive approach which demands the de-
velopment of precise and clear cut theories or hypotheses before the data col-
lection takes place. GLASER and STRAUSS criticised the “overemphasis in 
current sociology on the verification of theory, and a resultant de-emphasis on 
the prior step of discovering what concepts and hypotheses are relevant for the 
area that one wishes to research” (GLASER & STRAUSS 1967, pp.1f.) and 
bemoaned “that many of our teachers converted departments of sociology into 
mere repositories of ‘great-man’ theories” (ibid., p.10) leading to an antago-
nism between “theoretical capitalists” and a mass of “proletariat testers” (p.11). 
Thus the Discovery book was an attempt to strengthen the cause of researchers 
and doctoral students who formed this scientific proletariat:  
[...] we are also trying, through this book, to strengthen the mandate for gener-
ating theory, to help provide a defense against doctrinaire approaches to veri-
fication [...]. It should also help students to defend themselves against verifiers 
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who would teach them to deny the validity of their own scientific intelligence 
(p.7).  
GLASER and STRAUSS proposed a “general method of comparative 
analysis” which would allow for the “emergence” of categories from the data 
as an alternative to the hypothetico-deductive approach in social research. “We 
suggest as the best approach an initial, systematic discovery of the theory from 
the data of social research. Then one can be relatively sure that the theory will 
fit and work” (p.3). Following the Discovery book a crucial measure against 
the forcing of data into a procrustean bed would be to “literally to ignore the 
literature of theory and fact on the area under study, in order to assure that the 
emergence of categories will not be contaminated ...” (p.37).  
Ironically, such a stance represents one of the roots of positivist epistemol-
ogy. In the early days of modern natural sciences in the 17th and 18th century 
the most early empiricist philosophers like Francis BACON or John LOCKE 
were convinced that the only legitimate theories were those which could be 
inductively derived by simple generalisation from observable data. Following 
BACON, one of the most important tasks of an empirical researcher was to free 
his or her mind from any theoretical preconceptions and “idols” before ap-
proaching empirical data. However, since Immanuel KANT’s sophisticated 
critique of the pitfalls of early empiricism (nowadays often called “naïve em-
piricism” or “naïve inductivism”, cf. CHALMERS 1999) this epistemological 
position has lost most of its proponents – and even most of the followers of 
“Logical Positivism” in the 1930s did not adhere to it. The idea that researchers 
could approach reality “as it is” if they are prepared to free the mind from any 
preconceived ideas whatsoever has fallen into deserved bad reputation in con-
temporary epistemology.  
Both historical examples and recent philosophical analysis have made it clear 
that the world is always perceived through the ‘lenses’ of some conceptual 
network or other and that such networks and the languages in which they are 
embedded may, for all we know, provide an ineliminable ‘tint’ to what we 
perceive (LAUDAN 1977, p.15).  
It is impossible to free empirical observation from all theoretical influence 
since already “[...] seeing is a ‘theory-laden’ undertaking. Observation of x is 
shaped by prior knowledge of x” (HANSON 1965, p.19). Since the 1960s it is 
one of the most crucial and widely accepted insights of epistemology and cog-
nitive psychology that “there are and can be no sensations unimpregnated by 
expectations” (LAKATOS 1978, p.15) and that the construction of any theory, 
whether empirically grounded or not, cannot start ab ovo, but has to draw on 
already existing stocks of knowledge. At the same time this philosophical cri-
tique of inductivism and the emphasis on the “theoryladenness” of observation 
also highlights the role of previous knowledge in hermeneutic Verstehen 
(KELLE 1995, p.38): Qualitative researchers who investigate a different form 
of social life always bring with them their own lenses and conceptual networks. 
 136
They cannot drop them, for in this case they would not be able to perceive, 
observe and describe meaningful events any longer – confronted with chaotic, 
meaningless and fragmented phenomena they would have to give up their 
scientific endeavour.  
The infeasibility of an inductivist research strategy which demands an emp-
ty head (instead of an “open mind”) cannot only be shown by epistemological 
arguments, it can also be seen in research practice. Especially novices in quali-
tative research with the strong desire to adhere to what they see as a basic prin-
ciple and hallmark of Grounded Theory – the “emergence” of categories from 
the data – often experience a certain difficulty: in open coding the search for 
adequate coding categories can become extremely tedious and a subject of 
sometimes numerous and endless team sessions, especially if one hesitates to 
explicitly introduce theoretical knowledge. The declared purpose to let codes 
emerge from the data then leads to an enduring proliferation of the number of 
coding categories which makes the whole process insurmountable. In a meth-
odological self-reflection a group of junior researchers who had asked me for 
methodological advice described this proliferation of code categories as fol-
lows:  
Especially the application of an open coding strategy recommended by Glaser 
and Strauss – the text is read line by line and coded ad hoc – proved to be un-
expectedly awkward and time consuming. That was related to the fact that we 
were doing our utmost to pay attention to the respondents’ perspectives. In 
any case we wanted to avoid the overlooking of important aspects which may 
lay behind apparently irrelevant information. Our attempts to analyze the data 
were governed by the idea that we should address the text tabula rasa and by 
the fear to structure data to much on the basis of our previous knowledge. 
Consequently every word in the data was credited with high significance. 
These uncertainties were not eased by advice from the corresponding litera-
ture that open coding means a ‘preliminary breaking down of data’ and that 
the emerging concepts will prove their usefulness in the ongoing analysis. 
Furthermore, in the beginning we had the understanding that ‘everything 
counts’ and ‘everything is important’ – every yet marginal incident and phe-
nomenon was coded, recorded in numerous memos and extensively discussed. 
This led to an unsurmountable mass of data [...] (cf. KELLE et al. 2002, 
translation by UK).  
A more thorough look at the Discovery book reveals that GLASER and 
STRAUSS were aware of that problem, since they wrote: “Of course, the re-
searcher does not approach reality as a tabula rasa. He must have a perspective 
that will help him see relevant data and abstract significant categories from his 
scrutiny of the data” (GLASER & STRAUSS 1967, p.3).  
GLASER and STRAUSS coined the term “theoretical sensitivity” to denote 
the researcher’s ability to “see relevant data”, that means to reflect upon em-
pirical data material with the help of theoretical terms. “Sources of theoretical 
sensitivity build up in the sociologist an armamentarium of categories and 
hypotheses on substantive and formal levels. This theory that exists within a 
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sociologist can be used in generating his specific theory (...)” (ibid., p.46). But 
how can a researcher acquire such an armamentarium of categories and hy-
potheses? The Discovery book only contains a very short clue on the “great 
man theorists”, which “(...) have indeed given us models and guidelines for 
generating theory, so that with recent advances in data collection, conceptual 
systematization and analytic procedures, many of us can follow in their paths” 
(p.11). One may find this remark surprising given the sharp criticism of “theo-
retical capitalists” launched elsewhere in the book. Furthermore the authors 
write that an empirically grounded theory combines concepts and hypotheses 
which have emerged from the data with “some existing ones that are clearly 
useful” (p.46). However, in the Discovery book clear advice on how this com-
bination can be pursued is missing.  
Consequently, in the most early version of Grounded Theory the advice to 
employ theoretical sensitivity to identify theoretical relevant phenomena coex-
ists with the idea that theoretical concepts “emerge” from the data if research-
ers approach the empirical field with no preconceived theories or hypotheses. 
Both ideas which have conflicting implications are not integrated with each 
other in the Discovery book. Furthermore, the concept of theoretical sensitivity 
is not converted into clear cut methodological rules: it remains unclear how a 
theoretically sensitive researcher can use previous theoretical knowledge to 
avoid drowning in the data. If one takes into account the frequent warnings not 
to force theoretical concepts on the data one gets the impression that a 
grounded theorist is advised to introduce suitable theoretical concepts ad hoc 
drawing on implicit theoretical knowledge but should abstain from approaching 
the empirical data with ex ante formulated hypotheses.  
2. Different Approaches in Grounded Theory to Solve the 
Problem 
2.1 GLASER’s approach: theoretical coding with the help of  
“coding families” 
Much of GLASER’s and STRAUSS’ later methodological writings can be 
understood as attempts to account for the “theoryladenness” of empirical ob-
servation and to bridge the gap between “emergence” and “theoretical sensitiv-
ity”. These attempts followed two different lines: On the one hand, Barney 
GLASER tried to clarify the concept of “theoretical sensitivity” in an own 
monograph published in 1978 with the help of the term “theoretical coding”, a 
process which he demarcates from “substantive coding”. Two different types of 
codes are linked to these different forms of coding: substantive codes and theo-
retical codes. 
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Substantive codes are developed ad hoc during “open coding”, the first stage 
of the coding process, and relate to the empirical substance of the research 
domain. Theoretical codes which researchers always have to have at their dis-
posal “conceptualize how the substantive codes may relate to each other as 
hypotheses to be integrated into a theory” (GLASER 1978, p.72). Theoretical 
codes are used, in other words, to combine substantive codes to form a theo-
retical model about the domain under scrutiny. The examples GLASER uses 
for such theoretical codes are formal concepts from epistemology and sociol-
ogy which make basic claims about the ordering of the (social) world like the 
terms causes, contexts, consequences and conditions: by calling certain events 
(which were coded with the help of substantive codes) as causes and others as 
consequences or effects the hitherto developed substantive codes can be inte-
grated to a causal model.  
In the book “Theoretical Sensitivity” GLASER presents an extended list of 
terms which can be used for the purpose of theoretical coding loosely struc-
tured in the form of so called theoretical “coding families”. Thereby various 
theoretical concepts stemming from different (sociological, philosophical or 
everyday) contexts are lumped together, as for example 
- terms, which relate to the degree of an attribute or property (“degree 
family”), like “limit”, “range”, “extent”, “amount” etc., 
- terms, which refer to the relation between a whole and its elements 
(“dimension family”), like “element”, “part”, “facet”, “slice”, “sector”, 
“aspect”, “segment” etc., 
- terms, which refer to cultural phenomena (“cultural family”) like 
“social norms”, “social values”, “social beliefs” etc., 
and 14 further coding families which contain terms from highly diverse theo-
retical backgrounds, debates and schools of philosophy or the social sciences. 
Thereby many terms can be subsumed under different “coding families”: the 
term goal, for instance, is part of a coding family referring to action strategies 
(“strategies family”) and also belongs to a coding family referring to the rela-
tion between means and ends (“means-goal family”).  
Thus GLASER offers an equipment (one dares to say: a hotchpotch) of con-
cepts which are meant to guide the researcher in developing theoretical sensi-
tivity but fails to explain how such terms can be used and combined to describe 
and explain empirical phenomena. That this task remains extremely difficult 
and can hardly be achieved by applying single coding families can be easily 
shown with regard to the first and most important coding family referring to 
causal relations. The problem with that coding family is that general notions of 
cause and effect can never sufficiently specify which types of events in a cer-
tain domain have to be regarded as causes and which ones are to be seen as 
effects. Having terms denoting causal relations (like “cause”, “condition”, 
“consequence” etc.) at hand is in itself not sufficient for the development of 
causal models. Using such a coding family one could consider in principle all 
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events as causes and effects which covary to a certain degree. To formulate a 
causal model about the relation between certain specific events it would be 
necessary to use at least one substantial (i.e. sociological, psychological …) 
category in the development of a causal explanation which provides a clue 
about which types of events regularly covary. In order to develop theoretical 
models about empirical phenomena formal or logical concepts (like “causal-
ity”) have to be combined with substantial sociological concepts (like “social 
roles”, “identity”, “culture”). A major problem with GLASER’s list of coding 
families is that it completely lacks such a differentiation between formal and 
substantial notions. Thus the concept of theoretical coding offers an approach 
to overcome the inductivism of early Grounded Theory, but its utility for re-
search practice is limited, since it does not clarify, how formal and substantial 
concepts can be meaningfully linked to each other in order to develop empiri-
cally grounded theoretical models.  
2.2 STRAUSS’ and CORBIN’s approach: axial coding and the 
coding paradigm 
In his book “Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists”, published in 1987, 
Anselm STRAUSS describes a more straightforward and less complicated way 
how researchers may code empirical data with a theoretical perspective in 
mind. As with earlier versions of Grounded Theory the analyst starts with open 
coding “scrutinizing the fieldnote, interview, or other document very closely; 
line by line, or even word by word. The aim is to produce concepts that seem to 
fit the data” (STRAUSS 1987, p.28). Thereby STRAUSS notes certain difficul-
ties novices “have in generating genuine categories. The common tendency is 
simply to take a bit of the data (a phrase or sentence or paragraph) and translate 
that into a précis of it” (p.29). Such difficulties can be overcome by using the 
so called “coding paradigm” “especially helpful to beginning analysts” (p.27). 
It consists of four items, namely “conditions”, “interaction among the actors”, 
“strategies and tactics” and “consequences”, which can be used explicitly or 
implicitly to structure the data and to clarify relations between codes. This 
coding paradigm can be especially helpful during “axial coding” which “con-
sists of intense analysis done around one category at time in terms of the para-
digm items” (p.32).  
This idea is developed further in “Basics of Qualitative Research”, a book 
written by Anselm STRAUSS and Juliet CORBIN in 1990. Like GLASER, 
STRAUSS and CORBIN take into account the fact that any empirical investi-
gation needs an explicit or implicit theoretical framework which helps to iden-
tify categories in the data and to relate them in meaningful ways. While 
GLASER had used a list of more or less related sociological and formal terms 
for that purpose, STRAUSS and CORBIN drew on one general model of action 
rooted in pragmatist and interactionist social theory (cf. CORBIN 1991, p.36; 
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STRAUSS 1990, p.7) to build a skeleton or “axis” for developing grounded 
theories. This “paradigm model” is used “to think systematically about data and 
to relate them in very complex ways” (STRAUSS & CORBIN 1990, p.99) and 
for determining the main purpose of theory construction: analysing and model-
ling action and interaction strategies of the actors. Thereby, special emphasis is 
laid on the intentions and goals of the actors and on the process character of 
human action and interaction.  
Drawing on GLASER’s terminology one would regard STRAUSS’ and  
CORBIN’s coding paradigm as an elaborated coding family which guides a 
certain theoretical coding process (called “axial coding” by STRAUSS and 
CORBIN): categories and concepts, developed during open coding are investi-
gated whether they relate to (1.) phenomena at which the action and interaction 
in the domain under study are directed, (2.) causal conditions which lead to the 
occurrence of these phenomena, (3.) attributes of the context of the investigated 
phenomena, (4.) additional intervening conditions by which the investigated 
phenomena are influenced, (5.) action and interactional strategies the actors use 
to handle the phenomena and (6.) the consequences of their actions and interac-
tions. During axial coding the analyst tries to find out which types of phenom-
ena, contexts, causal and intervening conditions and consequences are relevant 
for the domain under study. If, for instance, social aspects of chronic pain are 
investigated the researcher may try to identify typical action contexts which are 
relevant for patients with chronic pain as well as characteristic patterns of pain 
management strategies. Thereafter it can be examined which pain management 
strategies are used by persons with chronic pain under certain conditions and in 
varying action contexts. This may lead to the construction of models of action 
which capture the variance of the observed actions in the domain under study 
and which can provide the basis for a theory about action strategies generally 
pursued in certain situations.  
Within this new and refined framework of Grounded Theory methodology, 
STRAUSS and CORBIN also take a more liberal position concerning the role 
of literature in the research process, maintaining that “all kinds of literature can 
be used before a research study is begun [...]” (STRAUSS & CORBIN 1990, 
p.56).  
3. The Split Between GLASER and STRAUSS in the 
1990s 
After having finished their cooperation in joint research projects GLASER and 
STRAUSS followed different paths in their attempts to elaborate and clarify 
crucial methodological tenets of Grounded Theory. Thus their approaches vary 
to a considerable extent. In the year 1992 GLASER turned against STRAUSS’ 
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and CORBIN’s version of Grounded Theory in a monograph titled “Emergence 
vs. Forcing: Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis”, published in his private 
publishing venture and written in an exceptionally polemic style. In this book 
he accuses STRAUSS and CORBIN for having betrayed the common cause of 
Grounded theory. The charge which is restated in various forms in this book 
and which represents the crucial thread of GLASER’s critique is that by using 
concepts such as “axial coding” and “coding paradigms” researchers would 
“force” categories on the data instead of allowing the categories to “emerge”. 
Contrary to STRAUSS and CORBIN, GLASER maintains that researchers 
following the “true path” of Grounded Theory methodology have to approach 
their field without any precise research questions or research problems (“He 
moves in with the abstract wonderment of what is going on that is an issue and 
how it is handled”, GLASER 1992, p.22) and insists that “there is a need not to 
review any of the literature in the substantive area under study” (ibid., p.31). 
Following GLASER, the application of theoretical background knowledge 
about the substantive field has to be considered as harmful when developing 
grounded theories: “This dictum is brought about by the concern to not con-
taminate, be constrained by, inhibit, stifle or otherwise impede the researcher’s 
effort to generate categories, their properties, and theoretical codes” (ibid.).  
GLASER strictly affirms the inductivist rhetoric already put forward in the 
Discovery book claiming that theoretical insights about the domain under scru-
tiny would “emerge” directly from the data if and only if researchers free them-
selves from any previous theoretical knowledge. However, GLASER’s version 
of Grounded Theory takes into account basic problems of inductivism to a 
certain extent: a strategy of scientific investigation which approaches an em-
pirical domain without any theoretical preconceptions is simply not feasible – 
such a method would yield a plethora of incoherent observations and descrip-
tions rather than empirically grounded categories or hypotheses. The concepts 
of theoretical sensitivity and theoretical codes can be seen as attempts to solve 
this foundational epistemological problem. But theoretical sensitivity, the abil-
ity to grasp empirical phenomena in theoretical terms, requires an extended 
training in sociological theory (cf. GLASER 1992, p.28). Consequently, the 
“coding families” proposed by GLASER in the book about theoretical sensitiv-
ity published in 1978 are of limited help for novices in empirical research who 
will have serious difficulties to handle the more or less unsystematic list of 
theoretical terms from various sociological and epistemological backgrounds 
offered by GLASER. And a researcher with a broad and extended theoretical 
background knowledge and a longstanding experience in the application of 
theoretical terms, on the other hand, would certainly not need such a list.  
STRAUSS’ and CORBIN’s concept of a “coding paradigm” serves to expli-
cate the construction of theoretical framework necessary for the development 
of empirically grounded categories in a much more user-friendly way. By 
drawing on this concept researchers with limited experience in the application 
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of theoretical knowledge can use Grounded Theory methodology without tak-
ing the risk of drowning in the data. One has to be very clear about the fact, 
however, that the coding paradigm stems from a certain theoretical tradition, 
which is pragmatist social theory rooted in the works of DEWEY and MEAD. 
Therefore GLASER’s suspicion that an application of the coding paradigm 
may lead to the “forcing” of categories on the data cannot simply be dismissed. 
However, if one looks more thoroughly at the conceptual design of STRAUSS’ 
and CORBIN’s coding paradigm GLASER’s critique seems to be overdrawn: 
the general theory of action underlying the coding paradigm carries a broad and 
general understanding of action which is compatible with a wide variety of 
sociological theories (ranging e.g. from Rational Choice Theory to functionalist 
role theory or even sociological phenomenology). It can be also argued that the 
“coding paradigm” to a great extent represents an everyday understanding of 
purposeful and intentional human action useful for the description of a wide 
array of social phenomena. However, it must be noted here, that STRAUSS’ 
and CORBIN’s coding paradigm is linked to a perspective on social phenom-
ena prevalent in micro-sociological approaches emphasizing the role of human 
action in social life. Researchers with a strong background in macro-sociology 
and system theory may feel that this approach goes contrary to their require-
ments and would be well advised to construct an own coding paradigm rooted 
in their own theoretical tradition.  
GLASER’s approach of “theoretical coding” whereby researchers introduce 
ad hoc theoretical codes and coding families which they find suitable for the 
data under scrutiny provides a strategy applicable for a greater variety of theo-
retical perspectives. However, as has been said before following this strategy is 
much more challenging esp. for novices since it lacks a readymade conceptual 
framework like STRAUSS’ and CORBIN’s coding paradigm. However, it is 
interesting to note that GLASER’s work obviously does not suggest a highly 
pluralistic use of coding families (which would include the use of concepts 
from macro-sociological approaches) since he seems to share STRAUSS’ 
strong inclination towards action and action theory; at least in his monograph 
“Theoretical Sensitivity” he asserts that coding and coded incidents have to be 
related to actions of the actors in the empirical domain.  
One of the most crucial differences between GLASER’s and STRAUSS’ 
approaches of Grounded Theory lies in the fact that STRAUSS and CORBIN 
propose the utilization of a specified theoretical framework based on a certain 
understanding of human action, whereas GLASER emphasises that coding as a 
process of combining “ the analyst’s scholarly knowledge and his research 
knowledge of the substantive field” (GLASER 1978, p.70) has to be realised ad 
hoc, which means that it has often to be conducted on the basis of a more or 
less implicit theoretical background knowledge. Compared to this major dis-
similarity, other differences between the two approaches play a minor role. 
However, GLASER seems to overstate some of them for rhetorical reasons. By 
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highlighting the “emergence” of theoretical concepts from the data he is drawn 
to exaggerated truth claims: following GLASER the task of empirical research 
is the discovery of social worlds and “facts” “as they really are”. “In grounded 
theory [...] when the analyst sorts by theoretical codes everything fits, as the 
world is socially integrated and grounded theory simply catches this integration 
through emergence” (GLASER 1992, p.84). Following such claims any attempt 
of further examination of the “emerged” verities becomes superfluous and a 
falsification of theoretical statements developed from the data simply would be 
impossible. This would not only denounce the well established idea (which is 
now common wisdom in almost any empirical science) that the purpose of 
empirical research is not to discover unchangeable verities but to tentatively 
suggest and further corroborate hypotheses, but also the epistemological insight 
that any empirical phenomenon can be described in various ways and that any 
object can be described and analysed under different theoretical perspectives. 
Instead it is suggested that if and only if the analyst frees himself/herself from 
any theoretical previous knowledge the “emerging” of categories from the data 
would ensure that only relevant aspects of the phenomena under scrutiny are 
recognised and described. This in fact represents a dogmatic inductivism 
prominent in early empiricist philosophy – the conviction put forward for in-
stance by BACON that researchers having cleansed themselves from any theo-
retical preconceptions and wrong “idols” and thus transformed the mind into a 
tabula rasa would gain the ability to grasp empirical facts “as they really are”. 
However, GLASER had made clear elsewhere that theoretical concepts do not 
simply arise from the data alone but through careful “theoretical coding” (that 
means: by categorizing empirical data on the basis of previous theoretical 
knowledge). Thus the suspicion arises that the parlance of “emergence” fulfils 
the function to legitimise a specific style of research: under this perspective the 
“emergence talk” would not serve the purpose to describe a methodological 
strategy but would simply offer a way to immunise theories with the help of a 
methodological rhetoric: following this rhetoric a researcher who follows the 
“right path” of Grounded Theory cannot go wrong since the concepts have 
been emerged from the data.  
4. Towards a Clearer Understanding of the “Grounding” 
of Categories and Theories 
From its beginnings the methodology of Grounded Theory has suffered from 
an “inductivist self misunderstanding” entailed by some parts of the Discovery 
book. Although this inductivism plays a limited role in research practice of 
many Grounded Theory studies (including those of the founding fathers) it has 
often lead to confusion especially among novices who draw their basic meth-
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odological knowledge from text books. In the past decades Grounded Theory 
has made considerable progress in overcoming the naïve empiricism of the 
emergence talk. Thereby the concepts of “theoretical sensitivity”, “theoretical 
coding”, “axial coding” and “coding paradigms” represent important steps in 
the development of an adequate understanding of how qualitative data can be 
used in the process of developing theoretical categories. Thus one can use 
Grounded Theory procedures without adhering to the basic “dogmas of empiri-
cism” (QUINE 1951) namely the idea that at a certain stage of the research 
process a kind of observation and description of empirical phenomena must 
take place which is not “contaminated” by theoretical notions. However, induc-
tivism still plays a vital role in the image of Grounded Theory for a wider audi-
ence as well as in interior methodological discussions, as the previous exam-
ples have shown. This leads to the fact that many epistemologically informed 
social scientists repudiate Grounded Theory after having read writings which 
seem to reject the trite epistemological fact that there can be no empirical ob-
servations “unimpregnated by expectations”.  
In the following it will be shown that the explicit use and discussion of some 
concepts nowadays widely discussed and well known in contemporary meth-
odology and epistemology could lead to a better understanding of the nature of 
empirically grounded theory construction, especially since an implicit use of 
these concepts already takes place and plays a role in Grounded Theory meth-
odology: 
1) the concept of abductive (or retroductive) inference, 
2) the concept of empirical content or falsifiability, 
3) the concept of corroboration.  
4.1 Abductive inference as a logical foundation of theory  
building 
In conceptualising the process of theory generation in empirical research often 
a wrong alternative is established between an inductivist concept and a hy-
pothetico-deductive (H-D) model of theory generation: according to the H-D 
model, favoured often by quantitative methodologists, research is seen as a 
process of hypothesis testing by means of experimental or quasi-experimental 
strategies. Following this view hypotheses cannot be derived from data, but 
emerge from the researcher’s speculations or happy guesses. The next step of 
the research process would be rational elaboration of such hypotheses and the 
operationalisation of their main elements, so that the hypotheses can be tested. 
Therefore, in the context of the H-D model the researcher has always to de-
velop precise hypotheses before collecting empirical data. Consequently, quali-
tative research that implies the utilisation of unstructured data and the genera-
tion of theories from that material would not be considered a rigorous and valid 
research strategy from the viewpoint of the H-D model.  
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However, since the 1970s a number of empirical investigations into the his-
tory of science have shown that the H-D model cannot provide an adequate 
account of the process of numerous scientific discoveries even in the Natural 
Sciences. As a consequence, a lively discussion about the role of logics of 
discovery and rational heuristics which has taken place in the modern philos-
ophy of science has challenged the view put forward by proponents of the H-D 
model that hypotheses emerge through a process which is governed by mere 
speculation or “happy guesses”. Investigations into the history of natural sci-
ences demonstrate that scientific discoveries were in fact not only momentary 
mental episodes that are not reconstructible as reasoning (cf. HANSON 1965; 
CURD 1980; NICKLES 1980, 1985, 1990). Although the context of discovery 
always contains elements of intuition and creativity, the generation of a hy-
pothesis can be reconstructed as a reasoned and rational affair. In one of the 
most illuminating reconstructions of scientific discoveries Norwood HANSON 
(1965) utilizes KEPLER’s discovery of the planetary orbits to show that logical 
inferences which lead to the discovery of new theoretical insights are neither 
inductive nor deductive. Instead they represent a special kind of logical reason-
ing whose premises are a set of empirical phenomena and whose conclusion is 
an explanatory hypothesis. 
HANSON called this form of reasoning retroductive inference, in more re-
cent writings it has been also called “inference to the best explanation”  
(ACHINSTEIN 1992). One could also use the term “hypothetical reasoning” 
which reflects its specific role in the research process: hypothetical inferences 
serve to discover a hypothesis which explains certain empirical findings.  
The earliest concepts of hypothetical reasoning were developed by the 
pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders PEIRCE who described a third form of 
inference apart from deduction and induction which he called “hypothesis” or 
“abduction”. Deductive reasoning is the application of general rules to specific 
cases to infer a result.  
The so-called major premise lays down this rule; as for example, ‘All men are 
mortal’. The other or minor premise states a case under the rule; as ‘Enoch 
was a man’. The conclusion applies the rule to the case and states the result: 
‘Enoch is mortal’ (PEIRCE 1974/1979, 2.621).  
Induction is an inversion of this deductive syllogism – by induction one 
generalises from a number of cases where a certain result is observed, and 
infers to general rule, claiming that these results can be observed in all cases of 
a class which the observed cases belong to. Another way of inverting a deduc-
tive syllogism is hypothetical inference which starts with an empirical phe-
nomenon and proceeds to a general statement which explains the observed 
phenomenon. Thereby the researcher either has a general rule at his disposal 
that leads to a possible explanation, or the hypothetical inference serves as a 
means to discover new, hitherto unknown concepts or rules. Often such an 
“abductive” inference (cf. REICHERTZ 2003) starts by a surprising, anoma-
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lous event which cannot be explained on the basis of previous knowledge: “The 
surprising fact, C is observed. But if A were true, C would be a matter of 
course. Hence there is a reason to suspect that A is true” (PEIRCE 1974/1979, 
5.189).  
Confronted with an anomalous event “we turn over our recollection of ob-
served facts; we endeavour so to rearrange them, to view them in such new 
perspective that the unexpected experience shall no longer appear surprising” 
(PEIRCE 1974/1979, 7.36). This is, of course, a creative endeavour which 
sometimes “comes to us like a flash” (PEIRCE 1974/1979, 5.182). Neverthe-
less, the researcher’s creativity is limited by certain constraints and methodo-
logical rules. First of all, the originality of the newly developed hypotheses is 
limited by the facts which must be explained. “It is not pure, ontological ori-
ginality in the relation to the ideas and perceptual facts at hand. Hypotheses can 
be original, but only if they still may explain the facts in question” (ANDER-
SON 1987, p.44). Furthermore, an abductive inference must not only lead to a 
satisfactory explanation of the observed facts but must be related to the previ-
ous knowledge of the researcher – “the different elements of the hypothesis 
were in our minds before”, as PEIRCE put it (5.181). For that reason abduc-
tions do not lead to the creation of new knowledge ex nihilo. Instead, every 
new insight combines “something old and something hitherto unknown” 
(7.536). Abduction becomes an innovative process by modifying and combin-
ing several elements of previous knowledge – “it is the idea of putting together 
what we had never before dreamed of putting together which flashes the new 
suggestion before our contemplation” (5.182). Scientific discoveries always 
require the integration of previous knowledge and new experience “[…] that is 
to say, we put old ideas together in a new way and this reorganization itself 
constitutes a new idea” (ANDERSON 1987, p.47). Many of the theoretical 
insights and developments in sociology which led to new and convincing ex-
planations of social phenomena may be reconstructed as arising from abductive 
inferences. This esp. relates to so called “middle range theories”, as for in-
stance DURKHEIM’s idea that differences between suicide rates result from 
differing levels of “anomia”, or WEBER’s explanation of the economic success 
of protestant merchants as a consequence of their religious orientations. The 
“labelling approach” which attempted to understand “mental illness” or devi-
ance not as an inherent personal quality or attribute of individual actors but as a 
result of processes of social interaction may serve as another good example. All 
these theoretical explanations of social phenomena which mark significant 
theoretical advancements in sociology started with sometimes surprising, 
anomalous or difficult empirical phenomena which were explained by drawing 
on theoretical concepts or ideas previously not applied to the domain under 
scrutiny: thus WEBER related success in worldly affairs to religious beliefs 
referring to transcendent realities. Or the proponents of the labelling approach 
interpreted odd or problematic behaviour as a result of interactive processes of 
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role definition and identity formation. In making abductive inferences, re-
searchers depend on previous knowledge that provide them with the necessary 
categorical framework for the interpretation, description and explanation of the 
empirical world under study. If an innovative research process should be suc-
cessful this framework must not work as a Procrustean bed into which empiri-
cal facts are forced. Instead, the framework which guides empirical investiga-
tions should be modified, rebuilt and reshaped on the basis of empirical 
material.  
4.2 Empirical content or falsifiability as a criterion for the  
applicability of theoretical preconceptions in qualitative inquiry 
Hypothetical inferences combine new and interesting empirical facts with 
existing theoretical knowledge in a creative way. By no means that does imply 
that the theoretical knowledge of the qualitative researcher should form in the 
beginning a fully coherent network of explicit propositions from which pre-
cisely formulated and empirically testable statements can be deduced. Rather it 
should constitute (a sometimes only loosely connected) “heuristic framework” 
of concepts (or “coding families”) which helps the researcher to focus the at-
tention on certain phenomena in the empirical field. But doesn’t that mean that 
theoretical sensible categorising and “coding” of data is merely a gift of char-
ismatic researchers? Can certain aspects of it be made explicit, for instance by 
determining relevant “theoretical codes” before the data are coded? Is the con-
struction and use of an (at least partly) predefined category scheme a sensible 
strategy in qualitative analysis or does this necessarily seduce the researcher to 
go astray so that he/she abandons basic principles of qualitative research, 
namely the principles of discovering new patterns and relations?  
To solve this problem it is helpful to discuss a concept which plays an im-
portant role in the writings of Karl POPPER and other traditional proponents of 
the H-D model: “falsifiability” or “empirical content”. This concept is normally 
used to identify sound scientific hypotheses in a H-D framework. In this con-
text one regards only clear-cut and precisely formulated propositions with 
empirical content as adequate hypotheses whereas concepts and hypotheses 
which lack empirical content and thus cannot be falsified are considered as 
highly problematic. Theoretical concepts with low empirical content, however, 
can play an extremely useful role if the goal of empirical research is not the 
testing of predefined hypotheses but the empirically grounded generation of 
theories, since they do not force data into a Procrustean bed – their lack of 
empirical content gives them flexibility so that a variety of empirical phenom-
ena can be described with their help. Although such concepts cannot be 
“tested” empirically, they may be used as heuristic concepts which represent 
“lenses” through which researcher perceive facts and phenomena in their re-
search field.  
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Two different types of such heuristic concepts may be used to define a cate-
gory scheme useable for the structuration and analysis of qualitative data which 
can be supplemented, refined and modified in the ongoing process of empirical 
analysis:  
The first important type of heuristic concept refers to a variety of theoretical 
notions, definitions and categories drawn from “grand theories” in the social 
sciences which are too broad and abstract to directly deduce empirically con-
tentful propositions. Herbert BLUMER invented the term “sensitizing con-
cepts” to describe theoretical terms which “lack precise reference and have no 
bench marks which allow a clean cut identification of a specific instance” 
(BLUMER 1954, p.7). Sensitizing concepts are useful tools for descriptions but 
not for predictions, since their lack of empirical content permits researchers to 
apply them to a wide array of phenomena. Regardless how empirically content-
less and vague they are, they may serve as heuristic tools for the construction 
of empirically grounded theories.  
A concept like “role-expectations” can serve as a good example for that. The 
assertion that individuals act in accordance with role expectations does not 
imply a lot of information by itself. This concept may, however, be useful to 
formulate a variety of research questions for the investigation of different sub-
stantive fields: Do role expectations play an important role in the empirical 
domain under study? What kind of role expectations can be found? By which 
means do empirical actors try to meet them? Do certain actors develop strate-
gies to avoid the fulfilment of role expectancies? Are such strategies revealed 
by other actors in the investigated field? Etc. Concepts from so called “utility 
theory” may serve as another example: at the core of utility theory is the idea 
that human actors will choose the action which seems the most adequate for the 
achievement of a desired goal from a set of given action alternatives. However, 
without specifying which goals the actors pursue and which actions they con-
sider to be adequate, such a proposition has no empirical content. The theory is 
like an “empty sack” (cf. SIMON 1985), if one does not specify further auxil-
iary assumptions. Instead of allowing for the development of precise hypothe-
ses utility theory may provide researchers with useful research questions and 
heuristic codes: qualitative researchers may, for instance, code text segments 
which refer to the potential costs and benefits that certain actions may have for 
the actors, they may code segments which relate to the intentions and goals of 
the research subjects or the means they use to reach their goals etc. In this 
manner researchers can draw on a wide variety of abstract notions from differ-
ent theoretical traditions to structure their data. But one should never forget in 
this process that sticking to certain theoretical tradition makes it easier to struc-
ture the data but also carries the risk that concepts are neglected that would suit 
the data even better and would yield more interesting insights. Even sensitizing 
and heuristic concepts that capture all kinds of different phenomena may lead 
to an exclusion of other theoretical perspectives: thus the extended use of con-
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cepts with a strong background in micro-sociological action theory (e.g. “ac-
tor”, “purposes” …) can preclude a system theory and macro-perspective.  
A strategy to cope with that risk (better suited than the waiting for an 
“emergence” of the most adequate theoretical notions from the data) would be 
the use of different and even competing theoretical perspectives on the same 
data. Furthermore, special attention should be paid to the question whether a 
chosen theoretical concept leads to the exclusion or neglect of certain phenom-
ena and incidents contained in the data.  
A second type of categories which do not easily force data but allow for the 
discovery of previously unknown relations and patterns are categories which 
relate to general topics of interest covered in the data material. Such topic ori-
ented categories can be often easily found by drawing on general common 
sense knowledge or on specific local knowledge of the investigated field. Cate-
gories like “school”, “work” or “family” represent simple examples for that, 
but topic oriented categories may be far more complex. However, one should 
always ask the question, as with heuristic theoretical concepts, whether a cer-
tain code really serves for heuristic purposes or whether it excludes relevant 
phenomena from examination.  
Both types of heuristic categories, categories developed from common sense 
knowledge as well as categories derived from abstract theoretical concepts fit 
various kinds of social reality. That means: it is not necessary to know concrete 
facts about the investigated domain in order to start using these concepts for 
data analysis. In other words: heuristic categories cannot be used to construct 
empirically contentful propositions without additional information about em-
pirical phenomena. This makes them rather useless in the context of an H-D 
strategy, but it is their strength in the context of exploratory, interpretative 
research. Regardless whether heuristic categories are derived from common-
sense knowledge or from abstract theoretical concepts the following rule is 
always applicable: with decreasing empirical content the risk that the data are 
“forced” is diminished.  
Thus the epistemological concept of “empirical content” and “falsifiability” 
can help to identify preconceptions which qualitative researchers (whether they 
apply Grounded Theory methodology or not) may use to structure the data 
material while minimising the risk to violate basic methodological concepts of 
qualitative research. Previous theoretical knowledge can be used at any stage of 
the process of empirically grounded theory construction if the researchers draw 
on theoretical concepts with limited empirical content (which the H-D ap-
proach would dissuade us to use). Thereby, the researcher may start qualitative 
analysis by using heuristic concepts and may then proceed to the construction 
of categories and propositions with growing empirical content. In this process 
grand theories play the role of a theoretical axis or a “skeleton” to which the 
“flesh” of empirically contentful information from the research field is added in 
order to develop empirically grounded categories and propositions.  
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However, in some cases also the use of categories and assertions with high 
empirical content can prove to be fruitful in a qualitative study. A researcher 
investigating the process of care-giving to frail and elderly people, for instance, 
may discover that Arlie HOCHSCHILD’s concept of “emotional labour” 
(1983) turns out to be helpful in the understanding of phenomena in the re-
search domain. This concept was initially developed to describe typical pat-
terns of action and interactions of flight attendants and air passengers but can 
be transferred to other domains of social services. Obviously this concept com-
prises more empirical content than the term “role expectation” – compared to 
the latter term “emotional labour” cannot be related to any social interaction. 
There are obviously social interactions which do not require emotional labour, 
and the assertion that certain service providers are expected to do emotional 
labour can in principle be falsified. On the other hand, the concept can be rather 
illuminating in understanding social relations in various fields.  
Consequently, it can be sensible in qualitative research to sometimes also 
use concepts which are closer to the understanding of the term “theory” in H-D 
research: definite categories and propositions about a certain field of social 
action that entail enough empirical content to be tested. There is no reason to 
abstain from such concepts, esp. since their use represents a long and well-
established tradition in qualitative research. Researchers and methodologists 
coming from the “Chicago School” of American sociology had proposed in the 
1930s a research strategy named “Analytic Induction” which was used thereaf-
ter in many famous qualitative studies. Thereby initial hypotheses are exam-
ined and modified with the help of empirical evidence provided by so called 
“crucial cases”. A well-known example comes from Donald CRESSEY’s 
qualitative study about embezzlement. During his research, for instance, he 
formulated the hypothesis that  
... trust violators usually consider the conditions under which they violated 
their own positions of trust as the only “justifiable” conditions, just as they 
consider their own trust violation to be more justified than a crime such as 
robbery or burglary (CRESSEY 1973, pp.104f) 
– a statement which can in principle be falsified, if one undertakes the effort of 
collecting data about trust violators. At a certain point in the research process 
CRESSEY indeed searched systematically for “crucial cases” and “negative 
instances” of trust violators who saw their trust violations as justifiable.  
However, by applying such a research strategy there is always the risk that 
data are structured with the help of concepts which are not suited for the spe-
cific research domain and which do not match the researcher’s theoretical 
interests and orientations. The already mentioned risk that the heuristic con-
cepts employed may contain too much empirical content for the researcher’s 
purposes is already prevalent with STRAUSS’ coding paradigm which can 
draw qualitative researchers towards a certain micro-sociological orientation 
which they do not necessarily share. On the other hand, the advice to use cate-
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gories with low empirical content may be unhelpful for inexperienced re-
searchers, since in a given research domain not every heuristic concept can 
draw the researcher’s attention to sociologically relevant phenomena and thus 
yield insights and interesting results. This danger may arise with GLASER’s 
“coding families”: it can be a highly demanding task esp. for novices to select 
the theoretical concept most suited for a certain research domain among a 
choice of numerous theoretical schools and approaches.  
An important task of qualitative methodology would be to show a middle 
path between the “Scylla” of forcing the data with preconceived notions and 
theories not suited for the domain under study and the “Charybdis” of an indis-
criminate and eclectic use of concepts from various theoretical traditions. The 
following methodological strategies can help researchers to avoid either dan-
ger: 
- The development of empirically grounded categories and hypotheses bene-
fits from theoretical pluralism. A pluralistic use of heuristic frameworks re-
quires that researchers have a variety of different concepts with diverging 
theoretical background at their disposal and obtain a flexible choice among 
them after having examined their appropriateness for the investigated phe-
nomena. Experts with longstanding experience may be able to choose the 
right heuristic concept intuitively thereby drawing on rich theoretical back-
ground knowledge. In contrast to that novices may benefit from an explicit 
style of theory building in which different “grand theories” are utilised in 
order to understand, explain and describe phenomena under study. A sys-
tematic comparison of the results from the use of different heuristic con-
cepts is by all means preferable to an “emergence talk” which masks the 
use of the researcher’s pet concepts. 
- A strategy already suggested by proponents of “Analytic Induction”, the 
systematic search for counter evidence, can reveal whether a given heuristic 
concept has high or low empirical content. If negative instances are easily 
found the applied categories obviously have a high degree of falsifiability 
or empirical content and may be not suited as heuristic concepts which are 
used in an initial attempt to structure empirical data. 
- The same holds true for an extensive search for empirical phenomena to 
which the used categories do not apply. If a variety of phenomena can be 
identified which cannot be covered by heuristic concepts used so far it is 
obviously necessary to look for alternative concepts which are suited better 
to capture the investigated phenomena.  
4.3 The necessity of corroboration of empirically grounded  
categories and hypotheses 
Contrary to an inductivist understanding a model of the research process based 
on “hypothetical” or “abductive inference” is consistently fallibilistic, that 
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means that it does not claim that the validity of propositions developed on the 
basis of empirical data can be simply ascertained by the fact that the researcher 
has freed the mind from any preconceptions whatsoever before collecting these 
data. Hypothetical inferences may lead to rational and well-founded assertions 
which are both consistent with observed phenomena and with previous theo-
retical knowledge. If these assertions are not only mere descriptions of ob-
served events but represent theoretical claims they have to be regarded as falli-
ble. The fallibility of any theoretical claim developed on the basis of empirical 
observation via hypothetical inferences can easily be seen from the fact that 
often one empirical phenomenon allows for several theoretical explanations 
which are contradictory but equally compatible with existing stocks of knowl-
edge.  
If one abandons the idea that definite and absolute reliable knowledge can 
be developed from empirical data via induction and if one explicitly acknowl-
edges the role of previous theoretical knowledge in the research process one 
must also not consider the demand to further corroborate empirically grounded 
theoretical concepts as an attempt to downplay or underestimate the role of 
exploratory inquiry compared to methods of (experimental or quasi-
experimental) hypothesis testing. This requirement rather represents a matter of 
course given the methodological fact that empirical research can never provide 
a final proof for theoretical propositions but only cumulative and always provi-
sional evidence. Whereas STRAUSS and CORBIN pay a lot of attention to the 
question how grounded categories and propositions can be further validated, 
GLASER’s concept shows at least a gleam of epistemological fundamentalism 
(or “certism”, LAKATOS 1978) especially in his defence of the inductivism of 
early Grounded Theory. “Grounded theory looks for what is, not what might 
be, and therefore needs no test” (GLASER 1992, p.67). Such sentences carry 
the outmoded idea that empirical research can lead to final certainties and 
truths and that by using an inductive method the researcher may gain the ability 
to conceive “facts as they are” making any attempt of further corroboration 
futile.  
If one does not want to adventure on claiming infallibility for particular re-
sults of empirical research the further examination, modification and rejection 
of empirically grounded hypotheses become an important issue. One may not 
only draw on STRAUSS’ and CORBIN’s more current writings about the 
methodology of Grounded Theory for that but can also use many concepts 
developed throughout the history of qualitative research, e.g. the already men-
tioned strategy of “Analytic Induction”, procedures for the examination of 
hypotheses in hermeneutic text interpretation in which different “Lesarten” 
(reading versions) of the same text passage are corroborated through sequential 
analysis of additional text (OEVERMANN, ALLERT, KONAU & KRAM-
BECK 1979) or methods for developing and testing causal hypotheses in quali-
tative research proposed by Charles RAGIN (1987). Techniques developed in 
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the past two decades for a computer-assisted categorisation, archiving and 
structuration of qualitative data can also support the process of further ground-
ing theoretical concepts in the data by systematically searching for empirical 
evidence and counter-evidence (KELLE 2004).  
5. Conclusive Remarks 
“Emergence” has turned out to be a rather problematic methodological concept 
which reflects the empiricist idea that researchers can and must approach data 
with no theories in mind. However, GLASER and STRAUSS did not overlook 
the fact that researchers always have to draw on their existing theoretical 
knowledge in order to understand, describe and explain empirically observed 
social phenomena. An alternative to an inductivist understanding of qualitative 
research can already be found in the Discovery book: the researcher’s “theo-
retical sensitivity” provides a “perspective that will help (him) see relevant data 
and abstract significant categories from his scrutiny of the data” (ibid., p.3). 
Thus the earliest version of Grounded Theory contained two different concepts 
concerning the relation between data and theory with conflicting implications: 
on the one hand the idea is stressed that theoretical concepts “emerge” from the 
data if the researcher approaches the empirical field with no preconceived 
theories or hypotheses, on the other hand the researcher is advised to use his or 
her previous theoretical knowledge to identify theoretical relevant phenomena 
in the data.  
Much of GLASER’s and STRAUSS’ later methodological work can be un-
derstood as attempts to further develop the concept of theoretical sensitivity in 
order to reconcile these prima facie divergent ideas. Thereby STRAUSS pro-
poses the use of a general theory of action to build an axis of the emerging 
theory. GLASER, although he had fully repudiated STRAUSS’ concepts in 
1992, proposed a similar idea in 1978: theoretical codes represent those theo-
retical concepts which the researcher has at his or her disposal independently 
from data collection and data analysis. Thus the controversy between GLASER 
and STRAUSS boils down to the question whether the researcher uses a well 
defined “coding paradigm” and always looks systematically for “causal condi-
tions”, “phenomena”, “context”, “intervening conditions”, “action strategies” 
and “consequences” in the data, or whether he or she should employ theoretical 
codes ad hoc, thereby drawing on a huge fund of “coding families”.  
Both strategies have their pros and cons: novices who wish to get clear ad-
vice on how to structure data material may be satisfied with the use of the 
coding paradigm. Since the paradigm consists of theoretical terms which carry 
only limited empirical content the risk is not very high that data are forced by 
its application. However, it must not be forgotten that it is linked to a certain 
micro-sociological perspective. Many researchers may concur with that ap-
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proach esp. since qualitative research always had a relation to micro-
sociological action theory, but others who want to employ macro-sociological 
and system theory perspective may feel that the use of the coding paradigm 
would lead them astray.  
Experienced researchers with a broad knowledge in social theory would 
clearly benefit from the advantages of theoretical coding – having at their dis-
posal not only one possible axis of the developing theory but being able to 
construct such an axis by themselves through the combination of theoretical 
concepts from different schools of thought. But regardless of which types of 
“theoretical codes” or “coding paradigms” are applied empirically grounded 
theory building should always be guided by an adequate epistemological un-
derstanding of the relation between data and theory. Thereby it is of utmost 
importance to abandon inductivist rhetoric and to develop a clear understanding 
of the role of inductive and abductive inferences in the process of empirically 
grounded theory generation. Furthermore the insight must be stressed that any 
scientific discovery requires the integration of previous knowledge and new 
empirical observations and that researchers always have to draw on previous 
theoretical knowledge which provides categorical frameworks necessary for the 
interpretation, description and explanation of the empirical world.  
To make sure that by applying theoretical knowledge one does not force 
data into a Procrustean bed one needs to thoroughly differentiate between di-
verse types of theoretical statements (namely between definite and precise 
hypotheses on the one hand and broad and general heuristic concepts on the 
other hand) and their differing role in the process of theory generation. Empiri-
cally grounded theory building starts by making a careful choice among a vari-
ety of concepts with diverging theoretical backgrounds after having examined 
their appropriateness for the investigated phenomena. By using such a heuristic 
framework as the axis of the developing theory one carefully proceeds to the 
construction of categories and propositions with growing empirical content. 
This should be accompanied by a meticulous search for negative instances and 
for empirical phenomena to which the used heuristic categories do not apply 
and which would call for their reformulation or abandonment. This style of 
inquiry should be supplemented by strategies of further corroboration of the 
empirically contentful categories and propositions developed in the ongoing 
course of theory building.  
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